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• Do the transfer system and electoral competition influence the 
behavior of local governments in Mexico?
– What determines the collection of the property tax by
mexican municipalities? mexican municipalities?
• Is the availability of unconditioned transfers a dissincentive? 
• Does political ideology make a difference?
• How do geographic and socioeconomic variables enter into the 
equation?Previous literature
• Model: 
– Tiebout (1956), 
– Fischell (2001), 
– Sennoga et.al (2007).
• Flypaper effect: 
–Gramlich (1977), 
–Gamkhar & Oates (1991, 1996), 
–Stine (1994);
• Role of local government: 
– Stigler (1957), 
– Olson (1969), 
– Oates (1972), 
– Stiglitz (1998);
• Determinants of property tax
collection:
– LAO of California (1996),
– Iregui et.al (2005).• The perspective of taxes as another means to match incentives of 
citizens and elected officials.
• The effects of a growing federalism and fiscal descentralization are only 
beginning to be studied in Mexico at a subnational level, and even more 
so at municipal level.
Contribution of this investigation.
• The scope of the work is unheard of: all municipalities with available 
data, for the past 16 years.
• Estimates place lost revenue from the property tax equivalent to the 
gains from the recent Fiscal Reform (2 3% of GDP).
• A political economy approach combined with solid econometric 
foundations to propose policy improvements that will impact public good 
provision.Mexico has the lowest tax revenue to GDP ratio of all OECD countries, and 
fares just as bad with the property tax in particular.
Comparison of property tax collectionTax collection is more concentrated than in any other OECD federation.
Comparison of property tax collectionElectoral margin has decreased significantly, paralel to the increase in property 
tax collection.
Comparison of property tax collectionAt the same time, federal transfers have grown at a much higher rate than local 
revenue.
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•Unconditioned transfers;




















• Typical “panel error” assumptions:
1. Panel heteroskedasticity (                                 ).
• Test: Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effects models.
2. Contemporaneously correlated errors (                                                     ).
• Test: Breusch Pagan test for cross sectional independence in the residuals 
of a fixed effect regression model.
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of a fixed effect regression model.
3. Serially correlated errors. (                                  )
• Test: Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data models.
• If these turn out possitive, then OLS does not make the most efficient use of the 
data. It over(under)estimates the standard errors, producing misleading confidence 
intervals.
t i t i t t i , 1 , , υ ε ρ ε + = −• OLS is not optimal in these situations since it does not make an 
efficient use of the data.
• Generalized Least Squares or FGLS (Parks,1967) and Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors or PCSE (Beck & Katz, 1995) can find 




• Nevertheless, FGLS only works if T>N. Even then it exhibits a serious 
overconfidence of the standard errors, leading to inacurate confidence 
intervals.
• PCSE outperforms FGLS, and is at least as good as OLS and more 
efficient if confronted with the previous characteristics, even when 
T<N (as is the case). Determinants and consequences of property 
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– Append, merge, sort and tsset the data:
Merge codigo ano using filename




Gen predialpc = predial/pobexc
Gen predialpcpos = predialpc+1
Gen lpredialpc = log(predialpcpos)
Gen laglpredialpc = L.lpredialpc
– Diagnostics graphs: scatterplots, sparl, histograms, correlation matrices:
sparl margen predialpc if codigo==19006Second: test diagnostics and model
– For serial correlation or the errors I used the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel.
xtserial laglparti pdepavg lpibpc ldenspob costa latitud altitud 
PAN PRD Otros margen d_coal d_ah d_cont d_unif d_ae
– For contemporaneous correlation of the errors I used the Bresch Pagan 
test.
xtreg lpredial laglparti pdepavg lpibpc ldenspob costa latitud 
altitud PAN PRD Otros margen d_coal d_ah d_cont d_unif d_ae, fe
Xttest2
– For heteroskedasticity I used the modified Wald test for groupwise  
heteroskedasticity in a FE model. 
Quietly: xtreg lpredial laglparti pdepavg lpibpc ldenspob costa 
latitud altitud PAN PRD Otros margen d_coal d_ah d_cont d_unif 
d_ae, fe
xttest3• If you have heteroskedastic, contemporaneous and serially correlated 
data (typical in social sciences), then you may use FGLS or PCSE. 
• As we have seen, PCSE is the most appropiate model given the 
characteristics of the data.
• xtpcse works like any regression command, with similar options and 
controls. Its assumes the first two situations and you can control for the 
Second: test diagnostics and model
controls. Its assumes the first two situations and you can control for the 
third.
xi: xtpcse lpredial laglparti pdepavg lpibpc ldenspob 
costa latitud altitud PAN PRD Otros margen d_coal d_ah 
d_cont d_unif d_ae tiempo i.d_edo, correlation(psar1) 
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• Instead of the usual display from STATA, you can install and use outreg2
to create formatted tables:
PCSE with panel specific AR1
laglparti 0.105*** Otros  0.019
(0.005) (0.015)
pdepavg  0.150*** margen 0.083***
(0.017) (0.012)
lpibpc 0.428*** d_coal 0.037***
(0.008) (0.011)
ldenspob 0.143*** d_ah 0.087*** outreg2 using tab1regs090414, excel  ldenspob 0.143*** d_ah 0.087***
(0.005) (0.009)
costa 0.374*** d_cont 0.024***
(0.022) (0.007)
latitud 0.000*** d_unif 0.016***
(0.000) (0.005)
altitud  0.000*** d_ae  0.020***
(0.000) (0.002)
PAN  0.003 tiempo 0.081***
(0.007) (0.003)
PRD  0.069*** Constant  5.523***
(0.009) (0.205)
Observations: 14,838 Standard errors in parentheses
Number of codigo: 1341 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
outreg2 using tab1regs090414, excel 
bdec(3) rdec(3) parenthesis(se) 
asterisk(coef) ctitle(PCSE …)Interpretation of results: using Clarify.
• As another means of presenting and interpreting the data, I made my 
first aproach to clarify software.
• Clarify is a program that uses Monte Carlo simulation to simulate
quantities of interest for several statistical models.
• It was developed by Tomz, Wittenberg and King (2000).
• To download go to http://gking.harvard.edu.
• Using three simple commands it produces information about your
regressions that is easily interpreted and understood.• First you estimate the model and simulate the paremeters:
estsimp model depvar idnepvars
• Then, you set the values of your indepvars before simulating 
the quantities of interest:
Interpretation of results: using Clarify.
the quantities of interest:
setx (depvars values)
• Third, you simulate the quantity of interest of you choice:
simqi qi(ev,pv,pr)• For example: we saw there is a significant difference between 
municipalities with a consolidated government. To measure the 
impact of that sole change, we:
1. estsimp reg predial lagparti pdepavg idh denspobexc 
PAN PRD Otros margen d_coal d_ah d_cont d_unif d_ae 
edos, r
Interpretation of results: using Clarify.
edos, r
2. setx (median)
3. Simqi, pr(fd) changex(d_cont 0 1)• Since we transformed the variables, the mean that Clarify 
estimates is easily interpreted:
First Difference: d_cont 0 1
Quantity of Interest |     Mean       Std. Err.    [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------------+-------------------------------------------------
dE(predial) |   13.99142     9.043636    -3.475092    32.00988
Interpretation of results: using Clarify.
– All else equal, municipalities that had seen a change of 
parties in government and then rewarded that party 
collected 14 pesos more per person vis a vis those without 
continuous government.
– This as opposed to a 0.024 coefficient  calculated for our 
dummy variable to be interpreted in terms of the log of the 
percapita property tax revenue!• Some other interesting findings using clarify. All else equal:
– Decreasing the dependency from transfers from the 90th to the 
75th percentile means collecting 9 pesos per person more in 
the near future.
– Tax collection falls by 21 pesos per person in election years;
Interpretation of results: using Clarify.
– Tax collection falls by 21 pesos per person in election years;
– Improving your HDI index from the median to the 60th 
percentile will imply collecting 10 pesos more per person; 
moving to the 75th percentile would imply 25 pesos more.
– When population density increases from its mean (225 people) 
to 500 people, local governments collect 4 pesos more; from 
500 to 1,000 7 pesos, from 1000 to 5000, 53 more.Determinants and consequences of property 
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• Said otherwise: political competition tends to improve the fiscal 
discipline of local governments, while unconditioned transfers have two 
contrary effects.
• Hard data on these issues is only starting to become available and 
trust worthy.• STATA has several tools that allow for manipulating and testing the 
data, running the correct model and, most importantly, managing, 
interpreting and presenting your results.
A non exhaustive list of such add ons is:
• sparl yvar xvar, options by Nicholas J. Cox.
• xttest2 by Christopher F Baum.
Concluding remarks.
• xttest2 by Christopher F Baum.
• Xttest3 by Christopher F Baum.
• Outreg2 using filename, options by Roy Wada.
• Clarify (estsimp, setx,simqi) by Tomz, Wittenberg, King.Determinants and consequences of 
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